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Introduction: 
The 1960's have seen a dramatic change in the Law dealing with driving 
offences involving alcohol. Prior to 1968 a person committed an offence 
when, while under the influence of drink or a drug to such an extent 
as to be incapable of having proper control of a motor vehicle, he drove 
or attempted to dirve a motor vehicle on any road. (l) 
Due to public concern at the ever rising road toll research was carried 
out to investigate the relationship between alcohol consumption, 
driving and road accidents. Research reports demonstrated that drivers 
who had been drinking were disproportionately represented in road 
accident figures. The likelihood that a driver would be involved in 
a road accident was seen to rise sharply with increasing blood alcohol 
levels. (2) 
Ultimately the Transport Amendment Act 1968 introduced a new strict 
liability offence; a driver now commits an offence if he drives a 
motor vehicle when his blood alcohol concentration is above the 
statutory prescribed level regardless of the way in which he is 
driving. 
This amendment rested on a large body of world wide scientific data, 
the implementation of which required the use of new highly sophisticated 
and analytical techniques. (3) 
To understand the position of the law in this area as it is now and 
as it might develop, a discussion of the early legislation and its 
development is necessary. 
The Development of Blood Alcohol Legislation 
Section 58(4) made it an offence to drive a motor vehicle when the 
driver was incapable of having proper control due to an excess of 
alcohol in his blood. Yet it was up to the traffic officer to 
decide whether a driver had had too much or not. General practice 
showed tha.t if a suspected drunken driver could w;:i_lk a straight linf' 
(1) 1962 Transport Act s.58 
(2) "Effect of small doses of alcohol on a skill resembling driving" 
Professor G.C. Drew,Privy Council Medical Research Council 
Memorandum No. 38 (1939)- R.R. Ladd; 1972 N.Z.L.J. pp.328-329 
(3) H.J. Walls & A.R. Brownlie "Drink, Drugs and Driving" 
H.J. Walls "Forensic Science" chapter 9 pp.69-83 
Victoria University of 
(4) 1962 Transport Act. 
Wellington 
Law Library 
chapters 2 & 3 
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to the satisfaction of a traffic officer, a prosecution was not 
initiated. The subjective nature of this section was inquired 
into by Parliament. (5) 
As a result, the first change came with the Transport Amendment Act 
1966 which amended sections 55(2), 58 & 59 of the 1962 Act, to 
provide that a person who was apprehended under the latter sections, 
would be presumed to be incapable of having proper control of a 
motor vehicle if his blood alcohol concentration was above a certain 
level. This was a rebuttable presumption. 
Section 62A(l) of the amended act was dependent upon the "voluntary" 
taking of a blood sample, and s.62A(7) did not allow as evidence 
the refusal of consent to a blood test. Thus this legislation was 
robbed of its effect. Drivers who believed their blood alcohol 
concentrations to be in excess of the statutory limit, naturally 
refused their consent to allow blood samples to be taken. 
A further parliamentary corrrrnittee was appointed in November 1967 to 
inquire into the adequacy of the existing law on blood alcohol testing. 
It was also asked to advise on the efficiency of breath testing and 
the application of it to New Zealand. 
The Committee found from the results of breath test experiments 
in New Zealand and overseas that breath analysis is an indirect 
method of assessing the amount of alcohol in the blood. It was 
felt that it was inadequate as a final determinant of a person's 
blood alcohol concentration. Scientific evidence demonstrated 
that the breath in the lungs equilibrates with the alcohol in the 
pulmonary capillary blood, and in the first litre of air which is 
expelled there is a proportion of alveolar air which varies between 
individuals from approximately 55% to above 93%. Breath testing 
devices are thus calibrated by their manufacturers on an average 
proportion of alveolar air. It is this factor which may produce 
'quasi positive' or 'quasi negative' results in certain persons. (6 ) 
(5) The 1966 Parltamentary Road Safety Committee devised parliament to 
set a limit aboe which a motorist would be presumed to be intoxicated 
subject to such presumption being rebutted by other evidence. 
(6) "The Drinking Driver-Overseas Situation and Experience" R.R. Ladd, 
1972, N.Z.L.J. pp 356,357. 
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The 1967 Parliamentary Committee advised that breath test analyser 
tubes could be used as a preliminary test as to whether a blood 
sample should b~ taken or not. Later, the 1968 Parliamentary 
Committee on Road Safety considered that the act of drunken driving 
wa, an offence worthy of a heavy penalty. It was therefore felt that 
the chemical tests necessarily involved in the determination of 
guilt or innocence, should be of the highest standard possible. Also 
it was recommended that the method to be used for final determination 
of a person's blood alcohol concentration should be the blood test. (7) 
The judiciary have looked favourably on the new law. In Beattie v 
· · f (S) 1 d h h Ministry o Transport Has an J. state tat t e excessive consumption 
of alcohol was a social evil. The Act showed the broad purpose of 
controlling motor transport in the interest of the community. Section 
S8A(
9
) with allied provisions is aimed at the particular mischief 
commonly known as drunken driving. 
weapon to combat this problem. 
The breathalyser is the legislature's 
There have been substantial amendments to the newly introduced blood 
alcohol provisions introduced in the Transport Amendment Act 1968~lO) 
The amendments were principally introduced to remove "loopholes" 
in the existing law and also to give effect to the recommendations of 
the various parliamentary road safety committees. 
"Loopholes" - Overcome 
There was a 'suspicion' amongst enforcement officers of the Transport 
Act that suspect drivers were avoiding conviction urrler the Act on the 
basis of a technicality. If an officer inadvertantly had not strictly 
followed the procedure set out in the act, the accused could bring this 
to the Court's attention and possibly have the case discharged. (ll) 
An amendment to the Act was passed in 1970~12) It provides that it is 
rot a defence to s58 1 (a) if ss. 58A and 58B are not strictly complied 
with, provided that there has been reasonable compliance with the provisions 
of these sections. 
(7) The 1968 Amendment introduced the compuslory taking of breath tests, from 
suspected drunken drivers, (ss.58 & 59 of the Amendment 1962 Transport Act.) 
(8) Ll973 11. N.Z.L.R. 20, 23 line 12. 
(9) s. SBA was introduced in the 1970 amendment to the act. 
(10) The following amendments were; 1970 Transport Amendment Act ss, 1971 Transport 
Amendment Act ss.9,10; 1971 Transport Amendment Act (No.2) ss. 2,3,4,5; 
1972 Transport Amendment Act ss.6, 7 & 8. 
(11) Borrows v Police 1969 ~. N.Z.L.R. 647; Hope v Transport Department t l97i J 
N. z. L. R. 449; also see Police v Thompson 'l 19,6·9 N~Z .J11. Rt. ~8 and Mc Combe v 
Transport Department ) J972 ) N.Z.L.R pl57. 
(J.2) Transport Amendment Act 1970 s.5 
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Under a previous amendment to s. 58A(3) there was no requirement that 
when a person was taken to a place he had to remain at that place. 
The 1971 Transport Amendment Act s.9 introduced into s. 58A(5) the 
direction that a person is required to give a specimen of his breath. 
Refusal or failure to comply with this, means that the traffice officer 
or constable may then arrest without a warrant. 
Section 58A(6) provides that every breath testing device used must be 
of a kind approved by the Minister of Transport by notice in the Gazette. 
In Beattie's case (l 3) the appellant contended that ss.(6) provides for 
approval, and the Gazette notice being one and indivisible, and that as 
the Gazette notice made no reference to Ministerial approval the Transport 
Breath Notice 1971 was invalid. The Court held that where a defect 
appears in a statute, the traditional approach of disallowing the Court 
from reference to material other than the statute itself, does not 
ipply. The full Court held that the Court may also look at social 
considerations which gave rise to the statute and also to look at 
the mischief that was aimed at, in order to find the intention of parliament. 
Although the report of this judgment makes no reference to s.5() d the 
Acts Interpretation Act, it could be argued that the Court did look 
at the Transport Act "fair large and liberally"to arrive at this 
conclusion, ass. 58A(6) is part of a penal statute. Penal statutes 
have traditionally been strictly interpreted as the welfare and interests 
of an individual are at stake. The Court has been seen in blood 
alcohol cases to be more concerned for the public welfare rather than 
the rights of the individual. (l 4) 
The 1968 amendment provided that if the first breath test was negative, 
no legal proceedings could be taken against that person, of which being 
incapable of having proper control was an element of the charge. (l 5) 
Some drivers were thought to have avoided convictions in this way. 
The 1970 Transport Amendment Act omitted these provisions, thus a 
negative breath test is no longer a bar to a careless driving charge. 
(13) [1973- j 1. N. Z. L. R. pp 20-24 
(14) Beattie's Case Q. 973 1 1. N.Z.L.R. p.20 contributes to this argument, 
also Police v Ward ll973l 2. N.Z.L.R. p.418. 
(15) ss. S9B(7), 59 C (10), (16) S 58 D. 
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The 1968 amendment did not completely cover the situation where a 
suspected drunken driver is taken to a hospital. A traffic officer 
or constable could only obtain a blood sample from a person who was 
in hospital or ' under medical care, if the attendant doctor had first 
been notified of the officer's request and if he was satisfied that 
the taking of a specimen would not be prejudicial to the patient's 
treatment or care. 
(16) 
The legislation was ineffective against drivers who feigned injury in 
order to be taken to the possible sanctuary of a hospital. 
The 1971 Parliamentary Road Safety CoTIUUittee recoTIUUended that; a 
blood sample should be taken from all road accident cases admitted 
to hospital, the sample should be made available on request from a 
traffic officer or constable - provided that the enforcement officer 
had a good cause to suspect an offence under ss.55, or 58 had been 
coTIUUitted, that hospitals be entitled to take blood samples from all 
road accident cases for their own research purposes. The Transport 
Amendment Act 1971 ss.4 embodies the findings of this CoTIUUittee. (l 7) 
Elements of the Offence of 'Drunken Driving' 
Good_Cause_to_Suspect 
Under s. 58 A (1) Transport Amendment Act 1968 if a traffic officer 
has good cause to suspect that any person has coTIUUitted an offence 
against ss 55 or 58 he may require that person to provide forthwith ( l 8) 
a specimen of his breath for a breath test. 
Good cause to suspect was discussed in Fletcher v Police~l 9) The 
Court held that whether good cause to suspect an offence specified in 
s. 58 (1 ) does or does not exist is to be determined on the whole of the 
facts of the case, and evidence of a driving offence is not essential 
for a finding of good cause. The case of Ministry of Transport v 
Van Hartitzcl C20) found that good cause to suspect means no more than 
a reasonable ground of suspicion upon which a reasonable man might act. 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
( 20 
S. 58 .D. 
As incorporated into s. 58.D (2) , (3), (4), (7) ,( 9),(11). 
The word 'forthwith' in s.58 A 
practical" Chesham v Wright 
19 7 OJ N. Z . L. R. p. 7 0 2 
lq721 N. 7.: .L.R. p.928. 
means"as soon as reasonably 
1970 i N. Z.L .R. p.247. 
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At the present time though, good cause to suspect on the part of the 
officer is a statutory condition precedent without the fullfillment of which 
the subsequent ·use of the statutory procedures will be in vain. C2l) 
However it is reported that steps are being taken by Parliament to 
bring down more legislation on the above point. The amendment planned 
is to provide that officers need simply suspect a driver of drinking, 
not as is presently the case do they have to suspect him of having 
committed an offence. ( 22 ) 
Time of the Offence 
Section 59 C (8) of the 1968 amendment provided no indication as to 
whether the presumption that the concentration of blood alcohol at 
the time of the test was the same at the time of the offence; was 
capable of being rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 
A full court in Stewart v PoliceC 23 ) held the intention of the legislature 
ins. 59 C (8) was for the presumption to be irrebuttable. The Court 
held the quantity of alcohol in a person's blood is irrelevant, so long 
as the proportion exceeded the prescribed limit at the time of the blood 
test. 
Followirg this decision Parliament amended s.59 C (8) ~
24
) The Canadian 
Courts in considering this question have found that the moment the 
driver's intention was germane was when he entered the car and he 
himself so long as he remained in the drivers seat can not by a 
later decision to step the car rebut the presumtpion that he had the 
care and control of the vehicle. C25 ) 
A recent decision of the Court of Appeal ( 26 ) reviewed the question of 
whether a traffic officer may acquire good cause to suspect an offence 
against s. 58 (1) and require a breath test after the suspected person 
has ceased driving a motor vehicle. The Court held that the section 
allows an officer with good cause to suspect to require a breath specimen 
(21) 
( 22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
Police v Anderson [J972] N.Z.L.R. p. 233,247 at line 3 
'Evening Post' Wednesday 31st July 1974, page 1. 
: 19701 N.Z.L.R. p.560 
S. 58B (11) "it shall conclusively be presumed that the proportion of alcohol in the blood at the time of the alledged offence was the same as the proportion of alcohol in the specimen of blood provided by the person 
so accused." 
The Queen v Sample 1963 ; 40 C.R.p.245, 42 W.W.R.p.501 
Police v Bradley l)974 : 1 N.Z.L.R. 113-116 line 20 - However, the Court don't wish to be too dogmatic in this approach. If more than a 
reasonable lapse of time has passed between driving & havin~ a good cause to suspect an otfence, no charge can be brought. However, wnat rs reasonable? 
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not withstanding that the driving has ceased completely before either of 
these two steps. 
Driving 
In the case of Hawkins v Transport Department( 2?) it was held that a 
person who is only steering or attemtping to steer a motor vehicle 
being towed by another motor vehicle by means of a rope is 'driving' 
the towed vehicle for the purposes of this section. 
Yet in comparison to the New Zealand law, the Australian case of Caughay v 
(28) 
Spacek held that a motorist who was merely steering his car while 
being towed by another car was not driving the car within the meaning of 
the Australian Act. 
Pursuit of Suspect onto Private Property 
Possibly the final word on pursuit of a person on to private property was 
said in Police v Ward. <29 ) Generally Parliament and the Courts continue 
to look upon the New Zealanders home as his castle, yet here too a 
traditional concept has had to yield to the dictates of the road toll. 
In this case a motorist was followed by a traffic officer onto the 
property of the motorist's parent. The officer had good cause to 
suspect the motorist as he was travelling at excess speed. The Court 
decided that an occupier of private property is bound to allow a 
traffic officer or constable to enter on to his property to carry out 
a breath test if the breath test is carried out without reasonable 
delay after the driving in question, of a person whom the constable 
or traffic officer has good cause to suspect of having committed an 
offence under s.58 A (1) 
'Loopholes' Resisting the Law 
The defence of a technicl error, is the accused's sole means of 
avoiding a conviction generally speaking. 
In Auckland City Council v Fraser(30)the Court held that the requirement 
to deliver a blood sample to a Dominion Analyst or a Government Analyst or 
(27) '.-1971] N.Z .L.R. p.1013 
(28) ;~ 9681 V.R. p.600 
(29) ;1973 ] 2 N.Z.L.R. p.418 
(30) ' 1973J 2 N.Z.L.R. p. 430 
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an officer of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research by 
a traffic officer or constable, is mandatory. This is one of the 
facts that the informant has to prove to secure a conviction. ( 3l) 
This delivery of the blood sample must be independently proved. 
not sufficient to state on the Analyst's Certificate that a named 
traffic officer had delivered the sample . 
It is 
It was held in the case of White v Auckland City Council that when an 
accused requests one part of the blood sample to be sent to an analyst 
f h · h · (3 3) h · h h..r h f h 
o is c oice, t e prosecution musts ow t er- t e one part o t e 
blood specimen was sent to an analyst, if it wishes to tender and 
rely on a certificate of the blood alcohol concentration of the accused 
under s. 58 B(9) as evidence. 
Under Police v Fisher( 34) the Court decided that one constable having 
good cause to suspect does not enable another constable to request a 
blood sample from a hospital. ( 35 ) 
Objections to the Blood Alcohol Legislation 
There are two general objections to blood alcohol legislation; 
(i) that it is an invasion of the rights and privacy of the 
individual's freedom as to amount to an assault, and 
(ii) that it is contrary to the basic doctrine of immunity from 
being compelled to give evidence likely to inc~iminate oneself. 
The general replies to these objects are; there are so many statutes 
authorising invasions into an individuals private affairs by the state 
that one more makes little difference. C5 ) Also, that blood alcohol 
legislation gives one as much opportunity of proving one's innocence 
as it does to scientifically concluding ones guilt. 
A Canadian Court has found that the compulsory taking of breath and 
blood samples does not offend against the rights of due process of law 
lf ..... h B"ll f R. h ('37) or se incrimination in t e i o ig ts. 
(31) s. 58B(6) Transport Amendment Act 1968. 
( 3 2) /J 9 731 2 N. Z. L. R. p . 2 7 
(33) s. 58B(7) 
(34) Ll974 i 1 N.Z.L.R. p. 579 
(35) s. 58D(5) 
(36) The Narcotics Act which permits searches of homes without warrants. Tuberculosis Act 1948 s16 authorising the detention of those suffering from the complaint. 
(37) Ll 972 j 7. C.C.C.(2d)p.181, 20 D.L.R.(3d) p. 603, s.c . c. 
r---- _____________________ ,.. 
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Summary 
The present position in the blood alcohol field does not bode well for 
the individual. The Courts are looking more toward social consideration 
rather than the rights of the individual. (33) The legislature is 
assessing the need to protect the public rather than the individual. 
The present Minister of Transport, Sir Basil Arthur has stated 
he supports the notion of 'random' testing: "I've dropped random 
testing because of the thoughts it conjures up in the public mind of 
road blocks on Sunday afternoon. But I think it will come eventually, 
specially if the number of offences and accidents involving alcohol 
does not drop. 11 ( 39) 
Indeed one could interpret this statement as meaning that the legislature 
will continue to tighten the blood alcohol laws as the road accident 
figures rise. Perhaps this is not the answer to the problem. 
Social drinking plays an important role in the rising numbers of road 
accidents. A campaign to better educate the masses as to the consequences 
of drunken driving may be the best deterrent, rather than harsher penalties 
being enacted for those convicted of drunken driving. 
-------------0 0 0 -------------
(38) Beattie's Case op.cit 
(39) ' Evening Post' 31 July 1974 page 1. 
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